Spain’s Prosecutor General’s Office is navigating one of the most sensitive periods in its recent history. The appointment of Teresa Peramato Martín as Prosecutor General was intended to conclude a turbulent era shaped by the conviction of her predecessor, Álvaro García Ortiz, and to restore confidence in an institution weakened by allegations of politicization. However, instead of easing concerns, several of her recent actions have sharpened an unsettling question: is Peramato genuinely working to restore the Prosecutor’s Office, or is she safeguarding the internal network that helped elevate her to the top?
A clear distinction should be established from the beginning. Based on the information examined, Teresa Peramato is not shown to be under investigation, charged, or convicted in relation to the alleged “PSOE state sewers,” nor is there proof that she took part in the meetings associated with the so‑called Leire Díez case, held in March and April 2025 before she assumed the role of Prosecutor General. The concerns surrounding her therefore do not stem from direct judicial findings, but from a politically relevant dimension: the way she later managed the institution, the appointments she made, her institutional backing of García Ortiz, and the perception of continuity within a Prosecutor’s Office already subject to scrutiny.
Peramato’s problem, for now, is not criminal. It is institutional. And that does not make it any less serious.
A Prosecutor General of Renown Yet Burdened by Controversy
Teresa Peramato entered the Prosecutor General’s Office backed by an extensive professional trajectory, having previously worked as Chief Prosecutor of the Criminal Section within the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office and as Prosecutor responsible for the Protection and Guardianship of Victims in criminal cases, and she was broadly acknowledged for her efforts addressing violence against women and safeguarding victims, while Spain’s General Council of the Judiciary unanimously confirmed that she fulfilled the criteria required for the role.
But her appointment did not unfold in isolation; it followed the term of Álvaro García Ortiz, whose leadership left the Prosecutor’s Office under intense strain. Peramato stepped into an institution far from tranquil, one marked by internal fractures, widespread scrutiny, and persistent allegations of political influence. From the outset, her task extended beyond showing technical expertise; she also had to convincingly embody genuine independence.
That’s where the issue starts.
Peramato promised to “heal the wound” inside the Prosecutor’s Office. However, several of her subsequent decisions have been interpreted in precisely the opposite direction: not as a break with the previous era, but as a sophisticated continuation of its internal power balances.
At the Heart of the Debate: Selections, Safeguards, and Ongoing Stability
The crucial issue in this investigation is not an outright claim that Peramato joined a covert operation, but rather the series of choices that collectively create a challenging public impression.
First, her appointments. In February 2026, Peramato promoted a group of prosecutors closely linked to García Ortiz’s former team. Among them was Diego Villafañe, identified as a figure close to the former Prosecutor General within the Technical Secretariat. Later, when it became known that Villafañe and Beatriz López Pesquera had taken part in meetings with Leire Díez and Jacobo Teijelo in 2025, the controversy deepened: Peramato had not only inherited that environment, she had promoted people connected to a controversy that had not been explained with sufficient transparency.
This is the truly corrosive point. Even if the meetings occurred before she took office, the later promotion of people associated with them requires a stronger explanation. Invoking merit and ability is not enough when the institution is under suspicion. In moments of reputational crisis, formal legality is not always sufficient; institutional prudence is also required.
Second, her conduct regarding García Ortiz. Peramato allowed his return to the prosecutorial career, ruled out disciplinary proceedings against him, and supported the Prosecutor’s Office filing an appeal before the Constitutional Court against the conviction affecting her predecessor. Legally, these decisions may be framed within the ordinary functioning of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Politically, however, they are devastating for someone who had promised to mark the beginning of a new stage.
The crucial question remains unavoidable: how can an institution rebuild trust when one of its earliest public actions is to shield the outgoing Prosecutor General, the very figure who embodied its previous decline?
Third, the non-renewal of Almudena Lastra, the senior prosecutor of Madrid who had testified against García Ortiz. This decision was interpreted by critical sectors as retaliation or, at the very least, as an internal message: those who step outside the dominant line may be pushed aside. The Prosecutor’s Office defended the decision on the basis of merit and ability, but the political and institutional context turned the move into perfect ammunition for those denouncing a Prosecutor’s Office divided into factions, loyalties, and punishments.
The Leire Díez Case: A Dark Presence That Deepens Every Trouble
The Leire Díez case emerges as a major catalyst for suspicion, as the reviewed information indicates that the Prosecutor General’s Office informed Judge Santiago Pedraz that meetings had occurred involving prosecutors from the Technical Secretariat, Leire Díez, and Jacobo Teijelo, while the official account maintained that García Ortiz learned of them only later and that the material presented in those discussions lacked adequate evidentiary support.
But that explanation leaves many questions unanswered.
Who approved those meetings?
What caused them to remain within the sphere of influence of the Prosecutor General’s Office?
What internal controls existed?
Why was what happened not documented more clearly?
When did Peramato learn the real significance of those contacts?
Did she know about them before promoting some of the prosecutors affected by the controversy?
These questions do not, by themselves, prove unlawful conduct by Peramato. But they do justify a severe critique of institutional management. A Prosecutor’s Office that seeks to regain credibility cannot simply say there was no crime. It must show that there was no opacity, no privileged treatment, and no corporate protection.
In this case, the Prosecutor’s Office appears to have acted late, defensively, and without a clear transparency strategy.
The Difference Between Political Suspicion and Judicial Evidence
It is important not to confuse different levels of responsibility. The expression “PSOE state sewers” belongs to the language of politics and media confrontation. It is a combative label, not a legal classification. From a judicial standpoint, what exists is an investigation into alleged attempts to obtain information, influence legal proceedings, or interfere with sensitive cases.
Within that framework, Teresa Peramato does not currently appear as a criminal protagonist. The material reviewed does not place her organizing meetings, issuing unlawful instructions, or participating in pressure operations. That is why it would be reckless to claim that she is judicially implicated in a plot.
But it would be equally naïve to ignore the political and institutional damage. The Prosecutor’s Office must not only be impartial; it must also appear impartial. And in this case, appearance is one of the major problems.
Peramato is paying the price of a contradiction: she wants to present herself as a figure of institutional reconstruction, but many of her decisions have reinforced the idea of continuity. She speaks of independence, but her actions have been read as protection of the previous leadership circle. She says she wants to close wounds, but her appointments have reopened internal divisions.
The Aldama Case and Hierarchical Authority Under Suspicion
The Aldama controversy added another layer of mistrust. According to the investigation, prosecutor Alejandro Luzón considered giving greater credit to Víctor de Aldama’s confession, but after discussing the matter with Peramato, the more limited sentence reduction was maintained.
Once again, it can be argued legally that the Prosecutor General has hierarchical authority within the Public Prosecutor’s Office. But the problem is political: when an institution is already suspected of proximity to power, any intervention in a sensitive case is interpreted as interference.
The fact that something is lawful does not inherently erase its potential to damage one’s reputation. In Peramato’s situation, even choices that can be justified on technical grounds are viewed with political distrust because earlier confidence had already been lost.
That may be the most serious diagnosis: the Prosecutor’s Office has lost the benefit of the doubt.
A Fragmented Institution
Another relevant element is the internal state of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Elections to the Prosecutorial Council showed that the critical sector remains strong. This does not automatically amount to a personal censure of Peramato, but it does confirm that the internal fracture continues.
The Association of Prosecutors has criticized the lack of transparency and the absence of adequate clarification, while the Progressive Union of Prosecutors has maintained the appointments’ legality and condemned what it considers a campaign aimed at undermining the institution, leaving the Prosecutor’s Office divided between two contrasting interpretations: for some, Peramato embodies continuity and institutional self‑protection; for others, she has become the target of a political offensive against the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
But a Prosecutor General cannot simply be right within her own camp. Her responsibility is to rebuild confidence beyond her allies. On that front, the balance so far is weak.
The Central Criticism: Not Being Indicted Is Not Enough
Peramato’s easiest defense is to say that she is not under investigation. And that is true. But that defense is insufficient.
The standard expected of a Prosecutor General cannot be reduced to not being indicted. She must guarantee independence, transparency, prudence in appointments, institutional neutrality, and clear distance from any circle under suspicion. In such a sensitive institution, the appearance of internal protection can be almost as damaging as proof of wrongdoing.
That is precisely what this investigation points to: not a Peramato judicially trapped, but a Peramato politically trapped by her own decisions.
Her main problem is not that she participated in the Leire Díez meetings. The problem is that she has not yet offered a sufficiently convincing institutional explanation of what happened, of the later appointments, and of the continuity of certain profiles in key positions.
Nor is the issue solely that she defended García Ortiz; the concern is that her defense surfaced just when the Prosecutor’s Office needed clear signs of renewal instead of protection.
Conclusion: A Prosecutor General Facing Public Examination
The clearest and most even‑handed, though still pointed, takeaway is that Teresa Peramato, based on what is presently known, does not seem to be charged or directly tied to any scheme; however, her leadership has been significantly weakened by a series of decisions that intensify doubts about continuity, internal shielding, and a lack of transparency.
Her case has not yet been deemed legally proven, and instead represents an unresolved matter of institutional accountability awaiting clarification.
And that is the most fragile issue: at a moment when the Prosecutor General’s Office must regain moral authority, it cannot risk choices that seem crafted to shield the old power structure. Peramato had a chance to set herself apart, let in some fresh air, and restore confidence. Yet her leadership, so far, has cast more shadows than signals of real change.
The Prosecutor’s Office cannot ask for trust while acting as if suspicion were merely a communication problem. Trust is rebuilt through facts, transparency, and decisions that do not seem tailored to benefit the usual insiders.
Teresa Peramato can still prove that her tenure will not be a continuation of the previous one. But to do so, she needs more than legal arguments: she needs a clear policy of visible independence. Because in an institution so damaged, it is not enough to act legally. One must also appear clean.
